Full Report

Figures converted from IDR to USD at historical FX rates (frankfurter.app). Monetary statements are shown in US$ millions; per-share figures use the matching period rate. Filing links open the native figures from which each USD value was derived.

The numbers behind PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked USD figure opens the exact filing row containing the native reported value from which it was converted. Amounts in US$ millions unless noted.

Reading notes: Saratoga Investama Sedaya is an investment holding company: it has no operating revenue line. The tab's revenue breakdown is the company's own reported segment disclosure - Income (loss), defined in the note as net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income - which is negative in loss years such as FY2023. All figures are in millions of Rupiah, the unit the audited statements are printed in ('Expressed in millions of Rupiah, unless otherwise stated'). Earnings per share are in whole Rupiah as printed. FY2021-FY2025 statement figures are each taken from that year's own annual report (audited consolidated financial statements, Exhibits A-D). FY2016-FY2020 figures in the long-term record come from the standardized data feed and carry no page links, except FY2020, which is cited to the comparative column of the FY2021 annual report. Segment definitions changed in the FY2021 filing: the pre-2021 scheme (Infrastructure / Natural resources / Consumer products / Head office and others) was replaced wholesale by Blue Chip / Digital technology / Growth focused / Others. The FY2021 annual report prints a bridge restating FY2020 onto the new scheme, so FY2020 is comparable; FY2016-FY2019 long-term totals are sums of the old-scheme segments and are shown without page links.

Share Price — Available History Since January 2026

The stock closed at $0.10 on Jul 27, 2026 — down 12% over the window shown, trading between $0.07 and $0.12. At that close the stock trades at 3.0× FY2025 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Jan 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends. Prices converted from IDR to USD with date-matched or nearest-available FX.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income (Loss) by Segment

Income (Loss) by Segment	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Blue Chip	1,518	415	(721)	363	335
Digital technology	32	(15)	(5)	(16)	(18)
Growth focused	270	9	10	(18)	90
Others	5	4	1	2	13
Total income (loss)	1,825	412	(715)	330	420

Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements — Segment Information. Segment income is net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income. [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (audited), as printed in each year's annual report. [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from analyst consensus, shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-28. Forecasts carry no filing page links.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Statements of Financial Position (audited). Saratoga presents an unclassified balance sheet — no current / non-current subtotals and no split of borrowings between current and long-term. [9] [10] [11] [12]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (audited). Saratoga reports operating cash flows by the direct method; in FY2021-FY2023 capital expenditure and the investing subtotal are printed as a single combined line. [13] [14] [15] [16]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Reportable Segment Assets

Reportable Segment Assets	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Blue Chip	3,562	3,555	2,679	2,822	2,924
Digital technology	92	82	77	58	43
Growth focused	531	400	416	458	568
Others	96	107	140	248	216
Total segment assets	4,281	4,145	3,311	3,586	3,751

Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements — Segment Information. [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total income (loss)	Profit (loss) before tax	Profit (loss) for the year	Diluted earnings (loss) per share	Net cash from (for) operating activities	Total equity
FY2016	523	461	399	0	20	1,356
FY2017	267	228	221	0	135	1,560
FY2018	(433)	(468)	(429)	(0)	(27)	1,117
FY2019	577	542	514	0	47	1,594
FY2020	643	609	618	0	26	2,198
FY2021	1,825	1,799	1,742	0	(25)	3,921
FY2022	412	381	301	0	241	3,888
FY2023	(715)	(735)	(660)	(0)	92	3,171
FY2024	330	305	204	0	(64)	3,210
FY2025	420	397	439	0	83	3,535

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [5] [13] [1] [9]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Operating KPIs

KPI	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Net Asset Value	3,942	3,961	3,176	3,347	3,617
Net Asset Value per share	0	0	0	0	0
Sum of investee companies (portfolio value)	4,186	4,005	3,193	3,451	3,646

Source: company-reported operating metrics [17] [18] [19] [20]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: Consensus Buy / Strong Buy on thin coverage: 2 analysts, 2 Buy (1 Strong Buy + 1 Buy), 0 Hold, 0 Sell (Yahoo Finance recommendationTrend; MarketScreener "Mean consensus BUY", 2 analysts; Investing.com "Strong Buy", 2 Buy / 0 Hold / 0 Sell). Mean 12-month price target 2,850 IDR (high 2,850 / low 2,850) per Yahoo, MarketScreener and Investing.com vs current price ~1,730-1,760 IDR (~62-65% upside); AlphaSpread's pool differs slightly at avg 2,779.5 IDR (low 2,626 / high 2,992.5) and TradingView shows a 2,850-3,400 IDR range. MarketScreener names Nomura as covering broker (last action: target cut to IDR 2,600 from IDR 3,000, rating kept at Buy). Currency IDR.

Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-28. Forecasts carry no filing page links.

Traceability

429 of 453 figures on this page (95%) link to the filing page containing the native reported figure from which the USD value was converted — click a linked figure to open that source row. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• Saratoga Investama Sedaya is an investment holding company: it has no operating revenue line. The tab's revenue breakdown is the company's own reported segment disclosure - Income (loss), defined in the note as net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income - which is negative in loss years such as FY2023.

• All figures are in millions of Rupiah, the unit the audited statements are printed in ('Expressed in millions of Rupiah, unless otherwise stated'). Earnings per share are in whole Rupiah as printed.

• FY2021-FY2025 statement figures are each taken from that year's own annual report (audited consolidated financial statements, Exhibits A-D). FY2016-FY2020 figures in the long-term record come from the standardized data feed and carry no page links, except FY2020, which is cited to the comparative column of the FY2021 annual report.

• Segment definitions changed in the FY2021 filing: the pre-2021 scheme (Infrastructure / Natural resources / Consumer products / Head office and others) was replaced wholesale by Blue Chip / Digital technology / Growth focused / Others. The FY2021 annual report prints a bridge restating FY2020 onto the new scheme, so FY2020 is comparable; FY2016-FY2019 long-term totals are sums of the old-scheme segments and are shown without page links.

• Income-statement labels follow the FY2025 annual report. Earlier filings word some lines differently - FY2022 and FY2023 print 'Dividend, interest and investment income' where FY2024-FY2025 print 'Dividend and interest income', and FY2021-FY2022 print 'other equity securities' where later years print 'other securities'. The amounts are on the same basis.

• Saratoga presents an unclassified balance sheet: no current / non-current subtotals and no split of borrowings between current and long-term in any year.

• The Net Asset Value KPIs are taken from the Management Discussion and Analysis value-generation table, which is printed in IDR billion. Their values are restated into the tab's IDR-millions scale (FY2025 NAV of 60,284 billion is shown as 60,284,000); the citation anchor is the figure as printed on the page.

• Quarterly profit-or-loss and cash-flow statements are printed year-to-date only (three, six and nine months). Quarters after Q1 are derived as the exact difference of two printed year-to-date figures and are marked as such; balance-sheet quarters are point-in-time and are as printed. No quarterly numeric feed exists in this run, so the derived quarters could not be cross-checked against a provider series.

• 5 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).

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PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Investor Presentation — January 2025 — January 2025

Saratoga's own company-overview deck and the fastest route from zero to understanding: what it owns, how it deploys and recycles capital, and how NAV is built. · Open the full document →

2025 Annual Report — performance, structure and NAV exhibits — FY2025

The deck stops at January 2025; these are the annual report's chart and diagram pages, carrying the current portfolio list, ownership map and the full sum-of-the-parts NAV. · Open the full document →

Investor Presentation — November 2024 (appendix) — November 2024

The core of this deck was superseded in January 2025, but its appendix — dropped from later editions — is the only place management maps the nickel and aluminium value chains its holdings sit in. · Open the full document →

More from management

AGM and EGM Material 2026 — 2026 · 27 pages · Management's own summary of FY2025 signed off for shareholders, plus the treasury-share and LTIP allocation put to the May 2026 vote. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2025 — 2025 · 47 pages · The full board slate reappointed in 2025 with candidate profiles, and the articles-of-association amendment passed alongside it. · Open →

Investor Presentation — August 2024 — August 2024 · 25 pages · The August edition of the same deck, on 1H24 figures — useful only to see what management was saying before the Brawijaya build-out. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2024 — 2024 · 31 pages · The FY2023 performance report and the buyback and treasury-share proposals put to shareholders after a year of NAV decline. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2023 — 2023 · 30 pages · The FY2022 report and the LTIP and share-buyback resolutions that set up the treasury-share programme still running today. · Open →

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PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2025 Annual Report — FY2025

The latest full account of a holding company whose reported profit is almost entirely the mark-to-market of ten investee stakes. · Open the full document →

Saratoga in Brief — p. 12 · Read the full section →

Defines the business in management's own terms: an active investment company that invests, grows and monetizes minority stakes.

Who Saratoga is, then the three activities it labels Invest, Grow and Monetize.

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk. (IDX Code: SRTG) is a leading active investment company in Indonesia with nearly 3 (three) decades of investment experience since its establishment in 1997. Saratoga has built a strong track record across multiple economic cycles, supported by a disciplined and long-term investment approach. […] With a passion for excellence, we actively approach investment opportunities early on where significant value can be added. […] We actively support our investment, leverage our expertise in investment management, sector knowledge, and wideranging access to debt and equity capital markets, locally and internationally. […] We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities.

p. 12 · Read in context →

Report of the Board of Directors — p. 23 · Read the full section →

Management's own framing of 2025: where capital was rotated, and the NAV outcome it produced.

Portfolio Highlights — p. 29 · Read the full section →

The asset-by-asset walk — the only place the unlisted holdings, which have no market price, are described at all.

The ADRO/AADI separation that split the largest holding into two listed lines.

In late 2024, ADRO completed its strategic repositioning to focus on mineral processing and renewable energy. Following the separation of its thermal coal subsidiary, PT Adaro Andalan Indonesia Tbk. (AADI), the Company managed its portfolios to concentrate all resources on its metallurgical coal and minerals business operated through PT Alamtri Minerals Indonesia Tbk. (ADMR).

p. 30 · Read in context →

The Digital Realty 50:50 joint venture, the year's main unlisted development.

In March 2025, BDIA reached a significant strategic milestone with the formation of a 50:50 joint venture with Digital Realty, the world’s largest global provider of cloud- and carrier-neutral data center, colocation, and interconnection solutions. […] Through Digital Realty Bersama, the joint venture owns and operates a connected data center campus in Jakarta, consisting of multiple strategically located facilities.

p. 33 · Read in context →

Review of Operations — p. 54 · Read the full section →

States plainly that income is dividends plus fair-value change, then attributes the 180% swing in net gain to two share prices.

The income model, and the TBIG/MDKA re-rating behind the IDR4,140 billion net gain.

Saratoga’s income is principally derived from dividend receipts, realized gains on investment disposals, and changes in the fair value of investments. […] In 2025, Saratoga recorded a net gain IDR4,140 billion from investments in shares and other securities, a significant improvement compared to 2024, when the Company recorded a gain of IDR1,478 billion. This turnaround was primarily attributable to the increase in the share price of PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk. and PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk.

p. 54 · Read in context →

Investments in Shares and Other Equity Securities — p. 57 · Read the full section →

The portfolio at carrying value, holding by holding — the balance sheet a holdco is actually judged on.

Ability to Service Debt — p. 59 · Read the full section →

How a company with no operating revenue funds itself: dividends, divestments and interest, against a 0.8% loan-to-value.

Borrowings more than halved to IDR1,450 billion; LTV down to 0.8% from 3.0%.

As of 31 December 2025, the Company’s total borrowings declined to IDR1,450 billion, compared with IDR3,214 billion as of 31 December 2024, primarily due to the repayment of bank loans. […] As of 31 December 2025, the Company’s loan-to-value (LTV) ratio declined to 0.8% compared to 3.0% in 2024.

p. 59 · Read in context →

Risk Profile — p. 101 · Read the full section →

Two risks specific to this structure: it inherits every industry its investees operate in, and it depends on its founders.

Inherited industry risk across investees, and dependency on founders and key executives.

The Company has investee companies operating across various industries, including the natural resources, infrastructure, and consumer sectors. Each of these industries is subject to its own inherent risks, which may affect the operational performance and financial results of the investee companies and, in turn, the Company's investment outcomes. […] The Company may be exposed to risks arising from its reliance on founders and key executives, as the loss of their services could affect leadership continuity, strategic direction and business performance.

p. 101 · Read in context →

f. Principles of consolidation — p. 130 · Read the full section →

The accounting policy that defines the business model: as an investment entity Saratoga does not consolidate investees, it fair-values them.

Investment-entity status under PSAK 110: controlled entities, associates and JVs all carried at FVTPL.

The Company is a qualifying investment entity stipulated in PSAK 110, “Consolidated Financial Statements”, and accordingly investments in controlled entities - as well as investments in associates and joint ventures are measured at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) in accordance with PSAK 109 with the exception of subsidiaries that are considered an extension of the Company’s investing activities (i.e. a subsidiary that is non investment entity (in accordance with PSAK 110) which only provides investment management services to the Company). […] As a result, the Company only consolidates subsidiaries that are non-investment entities (in accordance with PSAK 110) which provide investment management services to the Company (see Note 1e for the list of consolidated subsidiaries).

p. 130 · Read in context →

Valuation of Level 2 and 3 Investments Carried at Fair Value — p. 167 · Read the full section →

The auditor's key audit matter: 55% of assets are valued by judgment rather than by an observable price.

IDR34.5 trillion of Level 2 and 3 investments, 55.26% of consolidated assets, valued on unobservable inputs.

As at 31 December 2025, the Group's investing activities result in various Level 2 and 3 (including investments measured at cost) investments in shares and other securities totaling IDR 34,543,686 million, representing 55.26% of the total consolidated assets. Out of those in Level 2, a total of IDR 25,485,721 million are investments in entities that hold a direct ownership in publicly traded shares. […] Unlike investments in publicly traded equities whose prices are readily observable and therefore more easily independently corroborated, the valuation of these Level 2 and 3 investments is inherently subjective, often involves the use of inputs that are unobservable

p. 167 · Read in context →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2021 Annual Report — FY2021

Included for one reason: this is the year the segment definitions were replaced wholesale, and the report shows the bridge. · Open the full document →

17. Segment Information — p. 146 · Read the full section →

Sector segments (natural resources, infrastructure, consumer) were retired here for lifecycle buckets, with 2020 restated to match.

The three replacement segments — Blue Chip, Digital Technology, Growth Focused — as first defined.

The Company categories the segment information into 3 (three) main sectors which are the investment target of the Company.

These segments are determined based on the following considerations: […] 1. Blue Chip Companies

Companies included in this category are companies that have a national reputation, both in terms of quality, ability and reliability to operate profitably in various economic situations with good or bad conditions, usually listed as part of LQ45 on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

2. Digital Technology Companies

Companies defined here are companies that place an emphasis on digitizing business processes and services through sophisticated information technology and systems.

3. Growth Focused Companies

Companies that included in this category are companies that are still in the process of developing both in terms of income, as well as increasing the number of workers so that they can become bigger in the future.

p. 146 · Read in context →

More annual reports

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 167 pages · The base year for every 2025 comparison, and the year borrowings peaked at IDR3.2 trillion and LTV at 3.0%. · Open →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2023 Annual Report — FY2023 · 157 pages · The loss year: an IDR10.2 trillion mark-to-market loss shows what the same model does when investee prices fall. · Open →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2022 Annual Report — FY2022 · 162 pages · The commodity-peak year on the other side of 2023, useful for reading the portfolio through a full cycle. · Open →

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Competitors describe PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

PT Provident Investasi Bersama Tbk (PALM)

The closest listed analog to Saratoga in Indonesia and the one peer whose filings name Saratoga. PALM sits in the same IDX-IC G512 'Investment Companies' bucket, was built by the Provident founders who co-invested alongside Saratoga for two decades, and holds positions in the same asset families — Merdeka Copper Gold, Merdeka Battery Materials, and, until 2025, logistics and telecom. Its FY2024 register also carried PT Saratoga Sentra Business as a >5% shareholder of PALM itself, and until 17 March 2025 the two shared people as well as assets — PALM's Investment Committee included Michael W. P. Soeryadjaya, disclosed there as President Director of Saratoga since 2015. Read as the mirror of Saratoga's own mandate written by someone chasing the same assets.

PALM's own statement of its investment mandate, from the company-history section of the FY2025 annual report. The sector list — natural resources, technology, media, telecommunications, logistics — overlaps Saratoga's stated pillars almost item for item, and the selection criteria (attractive valuations, growth prospects, solid business models) are the same generic screen. What the passage also dates is how recent the rivalry is: PALM only became an investment company in August 2022, after selling out of palm oil. It is a mandate statement, not evidence of execution.

The Company's transformation continued following the divestment of all plantation-related Subsidiaries, with a new focus as an investment company. This change was accompanied by a name change to PT Provident Investasi Bersama Tbk, effective as of August 23, 2022 pursuant to Deed No. 122/2022 as stated in the Company Profile section of the Annual Report. In carrying out its role, the Company directs investments toward Indonesian companies with attractive valuations, strong growth prospects, and solid business models, particularly in national priority sectors such as natural resources, technology, media, telecommunications, and logistics, while maintaining discipline in risk management and investment.

p. 41 · Read in context →

PALM's supervisory board describing the 2025 rotation: out of logistics and telecommunications, deeper into natural resources, including a first-ever investment in a private (unlisted) gold vehicle in North Sumatra. Two things matter for the comparison with Saratoga. First, the direction of travel — concentrating rather than diversifying, and into gold specifically. Second, the move into a private company, which is where Saratoga has historically claimed an edge. 'Optimal returns' is the board's characterisation; the underlying transactions are itemised on p.52 of the same report.

Hardi Wijaya Liong (President Commissioner) — Report of the Board of Commissioners: During the reporting year, the Board of Directors undertook strategic actions through divestments in the logistics and telecommunications sectors generating optimal returns, while strengthening investment focus through new initiatives in the natural resources sector. The Company, for the first time, made an investment in Aurum, a private entity with strategic ownership in gold exploration and development projects in North Sumatra. […] The Board of Commissioners concurs with the Board of Directors' strategic approach in positioning the Company's investments in the natural resources sector as a key pillar.

p. 21 · Read in context →

The one place in the peer set where Saratoga appears by name in a competitor's filing. PALM's FY2024 portfolio review of Merdeka Copper Gold lists Saratoga first among MDKA's prominent shareholders, alongside PALM's own holding vehicle PT SAM and PALM's controlling shareholder PT Provident Capital Indonesia. It documents that on Saratoga's single largest listed position the relationship is co-ownership rather than rivalry — the same cap table, entered at different times. PALM's FY2025 report drops the shareholder sentence and describes MDKA without naming its owners.

PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk (“MDKA”) is a holding company that oversees various companies in the mining sector, including the production and exploration of gold, silver, nickel, and other minerals. Established in 2012, MDKA became a public company in 2015 with the share code MDKA. MDKA's Shareholders include several prominent Shareholders, such as PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk, PT PCI (via PT Mitra Daya Mustika), the Company (via PT SAM), and Mr. Garibaldi Thohir.

p. 41 · Read in context →

PT Indika Energy Tbk (INDY)

The Indonesian holding company redeploying coal cash flow into the same energy-transition and minerals assets Saratoga targets — gold, nickel, logistics infrastructure, EV, solar — and the peer that discloses hard capital-allocation numbers for the pivot. Indika is also the clearest read on how long a portfolio rotation of this kind actually takes: its own reports document the non-coal revenue target slipping by three years. Only the investment-holding and diversification discussion is used here; the Kideco mining and energy-services operations are outside the comparison.

Indika's statement of where it intends to put capital. The sector list — minerals, logistics and infrastructure, EV, nature-based solutions, solar, battery storage — is the same hunting ground Saratoga describes as energy transition, infrastructure and digital infrastructure. The Awak Mas figures are the operational anchor: a gold project 47.6% built at the end of 2025 with US$100.1m spent, targeting trial production end-2026. The 50%-by-2028 revenue split is a company target, not a result; the achieved mix is on p.312 of the same report.

Our transition is focused and disciplined—to achieve at least 50% of revenue from non-coal businesses by 2028 while strengthening portfolio resilience. Through Diversification, Decarbonization, and Divestment, we are accelerating toward a lower-carbon future, unlocking new growth and supporting Indonesia's energy security and climate goals as well as achieving its net-zero emissions target by 2050. We are expanding our portfolio by investing in low-carbon and high-growth sectors, including minerals, logistics & infrastructure, electric vehicles, nature-based solutions, solar energy, and battery storage. This supports the development of a more balanced, resilient, and future-oriented business. […] The Awak Mas gold project is currently in the construction phase, with trial production targeted for the end of 2026. As of the end of 2025, construction progress had reached 47.60%, with capital expenditure absorption amounting to US$100.1 million.

p. 26 · Read in context →

The two numbers side by side in Indika's operational review: 95.4% of 2025 capex went to non-coal businesses, yet non-coal was still only 18.0% of revenue, up 2.1 points on the year. This is the arithmetic of a listed Indonesian holding company rotating a portfolio in public — near-total redirection of new capital producing incremental movement in the revenue mix — and it is the closest disclosed benchmark for how quickly a peer's asset base can actually turn over. Revenue mix, not NAV mix; Indika consolidates its coal operations, so the denominator is operating revenue rather than portfolio value.

Of the total capital expenditure of US$139.0 million during 2025, the Company allocated US$132.6 million, or more than 95.4%, to the development of non-coal businesses. One of the key investment focuses is Awak Mas, a gold mining project in Luwu, South Sulawesi, which represents an important part of Indika's expansion into the minerals sector. […] As the transition is still ongoing, the coal business continues to serve as the main pillar of Indika Energy. In 2025, the coal business segment contributed 82.0% of the Company's revenue. Meanwhile, the proportion of non-coal business increased to 18.0%, up from 15.9% in 2024.

p. 312 · Read in context →

From the year-by-year transformation timeline printed at the front of the FY2025 report, which runs newest first — so the 2024 entry (the deferral) is quoted here ahead of the 2023 entry (the original target). Indika set a 50% non-coal revenue goal for 2025, then moved it to 2028. Management's own framing calls the original target 'highly ambitious' and the revision 'strategic adaptation'; the disclosure is unusually direct about a missed target, and it is the peer group's clearest evidence of the lag between announcing a portfolio pivot and delivering one.

As a form of strategic adaptation, the Company realistically adjusted its target of 50% non-coal revenue to 2028. […] In this phase, the Company set a highly ambitious target of achieving 50% of its revenue from non-coal sectors by 2025.

p. 5 · Read in context →

PT Astra International Tbk (ASII)

Indonesia's largest listed diversified group and the best-capitalised domestic bidder for the growth-stage minority stakes Saratoga pursues. Astra is a conglomerate, so only the capital-allocation and new-investment discussion in the FY2025 management reports is used here — the automotive, heavy-equipment and financial-services operations are outside the comparison. What the exhibits show is Astra explicitly targeting healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure and natural resources, and taking 20–31% minority positions in exactly the format Saratoga uses.

Astra's board naming its three target areas for new investment: healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure, and natural-resource ventures. That list is a near-complete overlap with Saratoga's stated pillars, and it comes from a balance sheet an order of magnitude larger — Rp507tn of total assets at end-2025. 'Significant headroom' is management's characterisation of the opportunity, not a sized market. The same page notes a Strategic Review still in progress, so the 2026 allocation is not yet fixed.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: The Group will continue its strategic priorities: strengthening and optimizing its core business, developing businesses that are adjacent to its core business, and investing in new strategic area. The Board of Directors sees significant headroom in healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure and potential natural-resource ventures. Future growth will be financed pursuant to a disciplined capital management, strict performance monitoring and a focus on operational efficiency.

p. 51 · Read in context →

The concrete version of the strategy above, and the exhibit that most directly prices the competition for assets. Astra discloses Rp8.6tn committed to healthcare across a listed hospital operator (Hermina, 20.2%), a digital health platform (Halodoc, 31.3%) and a specialist hospital, built up over four years. These are non-controlling stakes in Indonesian growth companies — the same instrument and the same sector Saratoga has used — funded from a group that generated Rp40.2tn of profit in 2025. Astra does not disclose the entry valuations or the mark on these positions.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: The Group increased its ownership in Halodoc to 31.3% and PT Medikaloka Hermina Tbk (Hermina) to 20.2%. As of the end of 2025, the Group's total investment in the healthcare sector, including Hermina, Halodoc and Heartology Hospital, amounts to Rp8.6 trillion. These transactions build on the Group's initial investments in Halodoc in 2021 and Hermina in 2022, reflecting a long-term commitment to developing a healthcare ecosystem.

p. 48 · Read in context →

Astra's six-year retrospective on how it invests, which separates two different activities that a diversified group can run at once: adjacency deals inside its existing franchises (used cars, financing, digital banking) and 'selective investments' in genuinely new sectors, healthcare and mineral mines. Only the second category competes with Saratoga for assets. The distinction matters for judging how much of Astra's capacity is actually pointed at the same deals — the adjacency spending is core-business capex that would happen regardless.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: Throughout this period, Astra continued to pursue opportunities in strategic investments in sectors with strong long-term growth potential. The Group has expanded into adjacent areas naturally connected to its core capabilities, such as increasing its investments in used car segment and broadening product offerings beyond traditional automotive financing (e.g. multipurpose financing, digital banking). The Group has also pursued new growth opportunities through selective investments in sectors such as healthcare and mineral mines.

p. 45 · Read in context →

PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk (DNET)

Listed alongside Saratoga in the IDX 'Perusahaan Investasi' grouping and running the same structural model: a small holding company whose reported earnings are equity income from long-held non-controlling stakes in Indonesian consumer champions, valued by the market on portfolio value rather than operating profit. Its one consolidated asset, the fibre network FiberStar, puts it directly in Saratoga's digital-infrastructure pillar, and its disclosures give a rare like-for-like read on the operating scale behind an Indonesian holdco's digital-infrastructure position.

DNET's entire portfolio in one sentence: one consolidated fibre subsidiary plus three associate stakes in Indonesian consumer businesses — the Indomaret convenience chain, KFC Indonesia and Sari Roti. It is the structural template Saratoga uses — a handful of concentrated, long-held minority positions in domestic champions — applied to consumer rather than resources and infrastructure. The disclosure gives no ownership percentages or carrying values; those sit in the financial statements.

Currently, the Company's core business focuses on investments through its ownership in the subsidiary PT Mega Akses Persada (“FiberStar”), supported by the performance of three associates, PT Indomarco Prismatama (“Indomaret”), PT Fast Food Indonesia Tbk (“FAST”), and PT Nippon Indosari Corpindo Tbk (“ROTI”).

p. 9 · Read in context →

The operating scale behind DNET's digital-infrastructure position: 483,455 customers, 63,758 km of fibre, 17 provinces, and subsea capacity reaching Singapore. This is the asset a rival Indonesian holding company has built in the same infrastructure category Saratoga lists among its pillars, and the customer and route-kilometre counts are the concrete yardstick for comparison. All figures are FiberStar's own disclosures via its parent; the 'national resilience' framing is the company's.

As of 2025, FiberStar has served 483,455 customers, supported by a fiber optic cable network spanning 63,758 km, delivering high-speed internet services with strong reliability. Currently, FiberStar services cover 17 provinces, including undersea cable networks connecting 145 cities/districts in Sumatra, Java, Bali, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi to Singapore. This terrestrial and submarine infrastructure is expected to strengthen national resilience, particularly in the development of Indonesia's digital economy.

p. 78 · Read in context →

DNET stating the analytical problem that all listed Indonesian holding companies share, Saratoga included: reported earnings are an accounting composite of one consolidated subsidiary and equity-method income from associates, so headline profit tracks the operating performance of whichever asset is consolidated rather than the value of the portfolio. Useful as the peer-set articulation of why these companies are read on portfolio value rather than reported earnings — DNET does not itself publish a net asset value.

As an investment company, the Company's financial performance is highly dependent on the performance of FiberStar as its subsidiary, which contributes revenue from customer contracts, as well as the performance of its three associates, which contribute to the Company's share of profit from associates and joint ventures. Accordingly, the achievement of the Company's financial performance is closely correlated with the operational performance of FiberStar.

p. 102 · Read in context →

PT Multipolar Tbk (MLPL)

The Lippo group's listed investment holding vehicle, competing for the same pool of investors who allocate to Indonesian holdco equity and, on the technology side, for the same growth-stage digital assets. Included mainly as a contrast case: MLPL states the same disciplined-capital-allocation doctrine as its larger peers while operating at roughly a twentieth of Astra's asset base and reporting a loss for 2025 — a reminder that the listed-holdco format in Indonesia spans very different underwriting outcomes.

MLPL's investment criteria followed immediately by its 2025 result, in the company's own sequence. The stated focus — healthtech, data and AI platforms, cloud, digital retail integration — is where MLPL says new money goes. The financial paragraph sets the scale: Rp15.1tn of assets, Rp6.3tn of equity, gearing of 0.3x, and a loss attributable to owners of Rp156.4bn. The 'remain solid' and 'solid operational performance' framing is management's; the loss line is disclosed in the same breath, so the exhibit carries both.

Adrian Suherman (President Director) — Report from the President Director: Furthermore, the Board of Directors directs the investment and divestment process based on an assessment of business feasibility, growth potential, and contribution to the overall portfolio strategy. The focus is on high-value initiatives such as healthcare technology, data and AI platforms, cloud solutions, and digital integration opportunities in the retail and consumer services industries. […] On a consolidated basis, the Company's financial fundamentals remain solid. Total assets increased to Rp15.1 trillion or increased 14.9%, driven by growth in current assets and optimization of the investment portfolio. Total equity also increased 29.5% to Rp6.3 trillion, reflecting its commitment to a sound financial foundation. Financial discipline is evident in the Debt-to-Equity Ratio of 0.3x and consolidated bank loans, which were successfully reduced to Rp2.0 trillion by year-end. Operational performance improved, with consolidated Net Sales growing 1.3% to Rp11.5 trillion. The Company also recorded gross profit of Rp1.9 trillion, reflecting solid operational performance, while loss attributable to owners of the parent entity amounted to Rp156.4 billion.

p. 31 · Read in context →

MLPL's claim to regional standing, from the corporate-history section: a repositioning in 2021 as 'a leading technology investment company in Southeast Asia' with a mandate to back local and regional startups. It is an unquantified self-assessment — no portfolio value, deal count or ranking is attached — but it marks where MLPL says it wants to compete, and the early-stage regional tilt is the one place in this peer set that differs from Saratoga's later-stage domestic approach.

At the end of 2021, the Company transformed into MPC to enhance its commitment to supporting and accelerating digital economic growth in Indonesia, thereby solidifying its position as a leading technology investment company in Southeast Asia. This transformation emphasizes the commitment to embrace more local and regional startups, in line with the vision to become a leading investment company and contribute positively to society.

p. 41 · Read in context →

More peer documents

PT Indika Energy Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 616 pages · The prior-year baseline for the non-coal mix (15.9%) and the earlier framing of the same five business pillars — useful for testing whether the 2025 language marks a real change of pace or a restatement. · Open →

PT Astra International Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 532 pages · The prior-year management reports, for dating when healthcare and mineral mines first entered Astra's stated priority list and at what carrying value the Halodoc and Hermina stakes stood before the 2025 top-ups. · Open →

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Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

What Saratoga is

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya is a Jakarta holding company that owns minority and controlling stakes in a concentrated set of Indonesian businesses and reports its own worth as the market value of those stakes less net debt. At the end of 2025 that figure was $3,617 million, or $0.267 per share [1]. The shares closed at $0.097 on 27 July 2026 [2]. The distance between those two numbers is what this report is about.

Saratoga describes itself as an active investment company, founded in 1997 and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange under the code SRTG [3]. It came to market on 26 June 2013 at $0.385 a share, split the stock five-for-one in May 2021, and has had 13,564,835,000 shares outstanding since [4]. That IPO price is $0.077 in today's shares, so thirteen years of listed life have produced a 60% price gain plus modest dividends. It employs 67 people [5]. There is no operating business at the holding company: it buys stakes, sits on boards, collects dividends and occasionally sells. Its own annual report says plainly that marketing is a matter for the investee companies, not the parent [6].

The company publishes its net asset value on a fixed arithmetic each year: the sum of investee company values, minus debt, plus cash [7]. For 2025 that was $3,646 million of investee value, less $87 million of debt, plus $58 million of cash, giving $3,617 million — up 12% on 2024's $3,347 million [8].

Sources: NAV per share from the FY2025 Annual Report NAV bridge [9]; closing price on 27 July 2026 [10]; market cap and discount derived from that price and the 13,564,835,000 shares outstanding [11].

What it owns

Four listed holdings account for three-quarters of the portfolio. Tower Bersama, a telecom tower operator with more than 24,300 sites, is the largest position at 30.7% of portfolio value [12]. Merdeka Copper Gold is a gold, copper and nickel producer; Alamtri Resources and Adaro Andalan are the two halves of the former Adaro coal group, separated in late 2024 into a minerals-and-renewables company and a standalone thermal coal producer [13].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Net Asset Valuation as of 31 December 2025 and 2024; portfolio shares derived from the same table [14].

Two things about that table matter for everything downstream. The first is concentration: TBIG, MDKA, ADRO and AADI together are $2,789 million, or 76.5% of investee value. The second is what sits underneath the four names — towers, gold and copper, metallurgical coal and minerals, thermal coal. Roughly 46% of the portfolio is priced off commodities, and coal in particular still funds much of the cash that reaches Jakarta.

The rest is a mix of a majority-owned automotive group (Mitra Pinasthika Mustika, 57.7%), industrial gas, construction, and a set of private businesses the company has been scaling: Brawijaya Healthcare, six hospitals and a clinic, which opened Brawijaya Taman Mini in 2025 [15]; ZAP, 118 aesthetic clinics [16]; the solar developer Xurya [17]; and the data-centre platform Digital Realty Bersama [18].

Where the money comes from

Saratoga's income statement is two very different things stapled together, and a reader who treats reported profit as earnings will be badly misled.

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss for 2025 and 2024 [19]; FY2023 Annual Report for 2023 and 2022 [20]; FY2022 Annual Report for 2021 [21].

The blue bars are unrealised revaluation of the stakes. They swing from a $1,709 million gain in 2021 to an $898 million loss in 2023 and back to a $248 million gain in 2025 [22][23]. They are a restatement of the same NAV that appears on the balance sheet, not income in any cash sense. Reported profit follows them: a $660 million loss in 2023, a $204 million profit in 2024, a $439 million profit in 2025 [24]. Earnings per share ran from minus $0.049 to $0.015 to $0.032 over the same three years [25]. Any multiple built on those numbers is arithmetic performed on a price index.

The orange bars are the cash business, and it is small, steady and legible. Dividend income was $181 million in 2023, $235 million in 2024 and $162 million in 2025, of which ADRO and AADI supplied $129 million in 2025, TBIG $14 million and MPMX $18 million [26]. Against that, the whole holding company costs $14 million a year to run and $10 million to finance [27]. Operating cost is 0.4% of NAV [28]. On a fee-comparison basis that is cheap for a managed pool of assets, and the cost line has barely moved in three years while NAV rose 23%.

The dependence on coal dividends is the obvious fragility. In 2025 the two Adaro entities were 79% of dividends received, and dividend income fell 29% year on year as thermal coal prices normalised, even as NAV rose 12% [29].

What shareholders have received

For three years Saratoga kept almost all of the cash it collected. That changed with the 2025 distribution.

Sources: dividends income by investee, FY2025 Annual Report [30]; distributions for FY2023 and FY2024, FY2025 Annual Report dividend table [31]; FY2025 distribution derived from the $0.00568 per share reported paid on 12 June 2026 and shares outstanding [32].

The distributions for FY2023 and FY2024 were $0.00136 and $0.00089 a share, $18 million and $12 million in total — 11% and 5% of the dividends the company itself had received [33]. For FY2025 the board deferred the amount to the general meeting of 18 May 2026 [34], and Indonesian financial press reported a payment of $0.00568 per share on 12 June 2026 [35]. That is roughly $77 million, seven times the prior year and about half the dividends received. At $0.097 it is a 5.9% yield. The corpus contains no company document stating the FY2025 per-share amount, so that figure rests on press reporting rather than a filing — worth confirming against the eventual FY2026 annual report.

Price against value

The company's NAV per share has been roughly flat for three years while the share price has not.

Sources: NAV per share from each year's Net Asset Valuation table — FY2022 Annual Report for 2021 and 2022 [36], FY2023 Annual Report for 2023 [37], FY2024 Annual Report for 2024 [38], FY2025 Annual Report for 2025 [39]; year-end closing prices from the FY2022 Annual Report [40], FY2023 Annual Report [41] and the FY2025 Annual Report quarterly closing price table [42].

NAV per share was $0.292 at the end of 2022 and $0.267 at the end of 2025 — down 1% across three years in rupiah terms, having fallen 20% in 2023 and recovered since [43][44]. The share price over the same window went from $0.164 to $0.095, and the intraday high of $0.250 set in the second quarter of 2022 is 54% above the July 2026 price in rupiah terms [45][46]. The discount to published NAV widened from 33% at the end of 2021 to 64% at the end of 2025, with a partial narrowing in 2024.

At $0.097 the market values the whole company at about $1.31 billion. The TBIG and MDKA stakes alone were marked at $1,768 million on 31 December 2025 [47]. On those marks the market capitalisation is 19% below the value of two holdings, with ADRO, AADI, MPMX, the industrial gas and construction stakes, the hospitals, the clinics, the solar platform and the data centres carried at less than nothing. The comparison mixes a July 2026 price with December 2025 marks, and the underlying stakes have moved since — the first-quarter 2026 statement shows investments in shares up 12% to $3,800 million [48]. Applying the company's own NAV arithmetic to that statement gives roughly $4.07 billion, near $0.300 a share, and a discount closer to 65%.

Who owns it

Three parties hold 89% of the shares. Edwin Soeryadjaya, the president commissioner and co-founder, held 35.87% directly at the end of 2025; PT Unitras Pertama held 31.62%; Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, the other co-founder, held 21.51%. The public float — every holder below 5%, some 22,383 of them — is 10.995% [49]. The three executive directors hold a further 0.15% between them, and each added shares during 2025 [50]; all three bought again on 1 July 2026 at $0.086 under the long-term incentive programme [51].

Concentration of that degree cuts both ways and the report should hold both edges. Owners with 89% of the equity bear the discount alongside the minority, which is the strongest structural argument that management's incentives point at NAV per share rather than at size. The same 89% leaves an 11% float in a market where average daily volume ran at 6 to 13 million shares a quarter through 2025 [52] — roughly $0.6 million to $1.1 million a day at current prices. An institution cannot build a position of any size, and the discount is partly the price of that fact. Coverage is correspondingly thin: two brokers, one published earnings estimate, and no revenue consensus at all [53]. The company holds no earnings calls; the corpus contains no transcript for any period, because none exists.

How solid the balance sheet is

For an investor whose first question about a leveraged-looking holding company is whether it can go bankrupt, the answer here is unusually clean. Borrowings were $87 million at the end of 2025 against $58 million of cash, giving net debt of $29 million and a loan-to-value ratio of 0.8%, down from 3.0% a year earlier [54]. Total liabilities of $216 million sit against $3,751 million of assets, and $123 million of those liabilities are deferred tax rather than anything payable to a lender [55][56]. The loan maturity ladder runs $15 million in 2026 and $46 million as late as 2029, against annual dividend receipts of $151 million to $263 million [57][58]. By the end of March 2026 borrowings had fallen further to $48 million against $62 million of cash and time deposits — a net cash position [59].

The financing risk in this structure is not the holding company's own leverage. It is whatever debt sits inside the investees, which does not appear on this balance sheet at all — a question the report should take up separately.

How much of the NAV is checkable

The NAV is only as good as the marks behind it, and the marks are not uniform. Of $3,405 million of investments in shares at the end of 2025, $1,567 million was Level 1 — quoted prices in active markets — $1,529 million Level 2 and $309 million Level 3 [60].

That looks worse than it is, and the auditor's own language explains why. KPMG's Indonesian member firm flagged the valuation of Level 2 and 3 investments as a key audit matter, noting they totalled $2,073 million, or 55.26% of consolidated assets — but also that $1,529 million of the Level 2 balance consists of investments in entities that hold a direct ownership in publicly traded shares [61]. Those are intermediate holding vehicles whose underlying assets carry observable prices. Netting them out, about $3.10 billion of the $3.65 billion portfolio — roughly 85% — traces to listed quotes either directly or one level down, and about $0.55 billion, some 15%, rests on discounted cash flow, comparable-company multiples or recent acquisition cost [62][63]. The auditor is explicit that the remainder is inherently subjective, uses unobservable inputs, and that holding investments through other investing entities further limits price transparency [64].

Two adjustments are worth making before treating that NAV as a target. The published NAV takes no deduction for the $123 million deferred tax liability that would crystallise on realising the gains; charging it in full takes NAV per share from $0.267 to about $0.258 and the discount from 60% to 59% [65]. And the marks are last traded prices applied to stakes of 15% to 32%; the exit price for a block of that size is not the screen price. Neither adjustment comes close to accounting for a 60% gap.

The question this report is built to answer

Saratoga is a founder-controlled Indonesian holding company whose shares trade around 60% below the market value of the stakes it owns, and this report exists to establish whether that gap is a permanent feature of an 89%-held, commodity-weighted portfolio, or a discount that the company's own cash flows, disclosure and record of monetising assets can narrow.

The evidence assembled here points to a real asset base rather than an accounting one: 85% of the portfolio is anchored to observable listed prices, the holding company runs on 0.4% of NAV a year, net debt is effectively zero, and management owns 89% of what is being discounted. The strongest fact on the other side is that the discount has widened, not narrowed, in three of the last four years while all of those conditions already held — which says the market is pricing something the balance sheet does not capture, whether that is float, governance, the coal concentration in the dividend stream, or simply the absence of a mechanism that converts NAV into cash for a minority holder. The FY2025 distribution of roughly half of dividends received, if repeated, is the first evidence in three years of such a mechanism. A second year at that payout, or a large realisation returned to shareholders, would change the read; a reversion to a 5% payout would confirm the bearish one.

What this chapter does not settle

Forward estimates are outside what the filings support: two brokers cover the stock, one publishes an earnings number, and no revenue consensus exists [66]. For a company whose reported earnings are a mark-to-market artefact, a consensus EPS is close to meaningless in any case; the forward question is dividends and NAV growth, and it needs its own treatment. The debt and prospects of the investee companies, the quality of governance around related-party dealings, management's compensation, and the track record of actual exits — each is a chapter's worth of evidence, and none is settled by what is above.

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Figures converted from Indonesian Rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

The cash that actually arrives

Saratoga's reported earnings are almost entirely fair-value marks. The cash that reaches the holding company is dividends from investees, and in 2025 that stream, net of every holding-company cost, came to $137.6 million — 9.6% of the $1.31 billion market capitalisation. Four-fifths of it came from two coal companies that together are 28% of the portfolio's value. This chapter separates the two flows and sets out what the single covering forecast says.

The audited cash flow statement is the cleanest window into the business. It shows six line items that recur every year — dividends collected, interest collected, interest paid, staff paid, tax paid, other operating payments — and two that are discretionary: proceeds from selling investments, and cash deployed into new ones. Stripping the discretionary items out gives a recurring cash result that ties exactly to the reported operating cash flow.

Source: audited consolidated statements of cash flows, years ended 31 December 2025 and 2024 [1]; subtotals derived.

$137.6 million of recurring cash income in 2025 is $0.0101 per share against the 27 July 2026 close of $0.0968 — a 9.6% cash yield on the market price, and 3.8% on the $3.62 billion net asset value the company publishes [2]. On the 2024 base of $245.5 million the same arithmetic gives $0.0181 per share and 16.6%. The two years bracket the range, and the difference between them is almost entirely one variable: how much coal paid out.

The holding company's own cost base barely moves. Staff payments ran $7.3 million in 2024 and $7.1 million in 2025 [3]; accrual operating expenses were $14.0 million against an internal target of $16.0 million, or 0.39% of net asset value [4]. Interest paid was $10.6 million in 2025 and will fall: borrowings were $87.0 million at year-end and $47.8 million at 31 March 2026, against $52.3 million of cash and $9.4 million of time deposits [5].

Across five years the gross flows tell the same story with more amplitude.

Sources: FY2021 Annual Report, Consolidated Statements of Cash Flow [6]; FY2022 [7]; FY2023 [8]; FY2024 [9]; FY2025 [10].

2022 is the outlier that matters for calibration: $1,313 million of disposal proceeds and $1,189 million redeployed in the same year [11]. Much of that was a restructuring of the Tower Bersama holding, in which shares were sold to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia while a group company subscribed for Bersama Digital shares, taking effective ownership of Tower Bersama from 34.23% to 31.26% [12]. Gross proceeds at this company are not evidence of monetisation on their own; the redeployment line has to be read alongside them.

Reported profit is a mark, not a receipt

The income statement runs on a different engine. Over five years the fair-value line swings from a $1,709 million gain to an $898 million loss and back to a $248 million gain, while dividend and interest income never leaves a band of $116 million to $239 million.

Sources ($ million): FY2022 Annual Report, Review of Operations [13]; FY2023 [14]; FY2024 [15]; FY2025 [16].

The tax line moves with the marks too. Deferred tax was a $100.1 million charge in 2024 and a $44.9 million credit in 2025 [17], against cash income tax actually paid of $0.3 million and $1.6 million [18]. Three lines of the profit and loss account — the fair-value gain, the deferred tax, and therefore the bottom line — are opinions about prices rather than transactions.

The first quarter of 2026 is the cleanest single illustration. Reported profit was $319.3 million, or $0.0236 per share, on a $414.7 million fair-value gain and a $90.0 million deferred tax charge; dividend and interest income recognised in the quarter was $0.4 million [19]. The cash statement for the same three months shows $42.3 million of dividends actually collected and $5.8 million deployed [20]; the related-party receivable fell from $43.9 million to $1.6 million over the quarter [21], a balance the company attributes largely to dividends receivable from Alamtri Resources [22]. Dividend income is recognised on declaration, and declarations cluster in the second and third quarters, so a single quarter's income statement says almost nothing about the year's cash.

Sources: profit from the Review of Operations tables, FY2022 and FY2025 Annual Reports [23], [24]; cash dividend receipts from the cash flow discussions [25], [26].

Where the value sits and where the income comes from

The dividend income breakdown is disclosed by investee every year, and for anyone holding the shares for the cash it is the most consequential table in the annual report.

Sources: dividend income breakdown tables, FY2022 Annual Report [27], FY2024 [28], FY2025 [29]; coal is Adaro Energy Indonesia, renamed Alamtri Resources Indonesia, plus Adaro Andalan Indonesia from 2025.

Coal's share of dividend income has been 67%, 74%, 77%, 82% and 79% in the five years to 2025 [30], [31], [32]. It has never been below two-thirds. The 2025 fall in total dividend income, from $234.7 million to $162.3 million, was Alamtri cutting from $193.5 million to $90.9 million, partly offset by $38.0 million of first-time dividends from Adaro Andalan after the thermal coal separation [33].

Set that against where the portfolio value actually sits at 31 December 2025.

Source: derived from the net asset valuation table and the dividend income breakdown, FY2025 Annual Report [34], [35].

The two largest holdings by value — Tower Bersama at $1,119.8 million and Merdeka Copper Gold at $648.4 million, together 48% of the $3,646.1 million portfolio [36] — supplied 8% of dividend income between them, Merdeka none at all [37]. The two coal companies, 28% of value, supplied 79%. The discount is a claim on towers and copper; the yield is a claim on coal. One share certificate delivers both, but they are not the same asset and they will not decline or recover together.

That divergence also explains why the mark and the cash moved in opposite directions in 2025. Tower Bersama and Merdeka added $203.9 million and $197.0 million of fair-value gains while Alamtri and Adaro Andalan subtracted $276.0 million [38] — net asset value per share rose 12% to $0.2666 [39] in the same year cash dividend receipts fell 41% [40].

Debt first, dividend last

What Saratoga does with the cash has followed a consistent order of priority, and the dividend has come last in it. The record of distributions, by the year each was paid:

Sources: dividend tables, FY2022 Annual Report [41], FY2023 [42], FY2025 [43]; the 2026 amount from Indonesian press coverage of the May 2026 general meeting [44]. The 2021 payment is shown adjusted for the five-for-one split.

The $0.00568 paid in June 2026 is the largest per-share amount in the company's listed history, and the $77.1 million total is the second distribution of that order in four years: $66.1 million, or $0.00488 per share, went out in June 2023 [45]. What followed is the more instructive part: distributions fell to $18.5 million and then $12.0 million [46] across 2024 and 2025 — the two years in which the company deployed $357.9 million into new investments [47] and drew $219.0 million of bank loans to help fund it [48]. In 2025 the priority reversed: $281.1 million of loans were repaid against $175.9 million drawn and deployment halved [49], leaving borrowings at $87.0 million and loan-to-value at 0.8% [50]. The large dividend arrived only once the balance sheet was clean.

There is no formula behind any of this, and the company says so. Its stated policy is that dividends require sufficient profit or positive retained earnings and are subject to the board's recommendation and shareholder approval, with no payout ratio specified [51]. The meeting that approved the 2026 payment framed it as 19.13% of FY2025 net profit of $439.2 million [52] — a percentage of a number that was itself 57% fair-value gain on investments [53]. The same ratio applied to the 2023 loss year would have produced nothing.

My read is that the dividend at Saratoga is a residual rather than a claim: it is what remains after management has decided how much to invest and how much debt to carry, and those two decisions come first. The strongest fact against that reading is the 2026 sequence itself — the payment was raised sevenfold in a year when dividend receipts fell 41%, which is a deliberate step up rather than residual behaviour. A second year would settle it: a payment near $0.0055 per share for FY2026 alongside continued deployment would establish a policy where none is written down.

Forward estimates, and how thin they are

Management publishes no forward financial guidance. The FY2025 annual report states that as an investment holding company it does not set quantitative targets for investment deployment, realised gains or net profit, and the section headed "Target for 2026" says the company sets formal annual targets only for operating expenses [54], [55]. There are no earnings calls and no transcripts in any period, so there is no management commentary to model against either.

That leaves a single sell-side model. The figures below are the consensus as compiled for this report, with one contributing estimate on earnings and dividends, converted throughout at the most recent rate.

Source: consensus estimates as compiled for this report; one contributing analyst on earnings and dividends. The 2025 row is the estimate, not the reported outcome.

Two things are worth extracting from it, and one warning.

The model strips fair value out entirely. Its forecast operating result is roughly minus $13.8 million to minus $16.5 million a year — the holding company's cost base and nothing else — with dividends carried below that line. The widely quoted "EPS growth" figures for Saratoga therefore compare a normalised forecast against a mark-inclusive actual: the 2025 estimate of $0.0036 sits against reported basic earnings of $0.0297 per share, converted at the same rate for comparability [56], and the resulting "decline" for 2026 is an artefact of the two bases, not a forecast of deterioration.

On its own terms, the model puts normalised earnings at $0.0082 per share for 2026 and $0.0107 for 2027. At $0.0968 that is 11.9 times 2026 and 9.0 times 2027. The dividend line reads $0.0057 for 2026 — within rounding of the $0.00568 already paid in June — then $0.0043 for 2027, a 25% reduction. Whether that reflects a view on sustainability or simply a payment-year convention cannot be determined from the data available; either way, the one house modelling this stock does not carry the June amount forward as a run rate. The mean twelve-month price target is $0.157, and one covering broker cut its target to $0.143 from $0.165 in July 2025.

The warning is reconciliation. The model's 2025 normalised net income of $49.4 million is well below the $137.6 million of recurring cash the audited cash flow statement shows [57]. Whatever normalisation produces that gap is not disclosed, and with a single contributor there is no second model to triangulate against. These estimates are one house's view and should be read as such rather than as a market consensus.

The more useful forward number comes from management by way of the press: a target of $100–150 million of new investment a year, in healthcare, renewables, digital infrastructure and consumer [58]. Placed against the FY2025 recurring cash base of $137.6 million, the deployment target alone absorbs 73% to 110% of it, and the 2026 dividend absorbs a further 61%. Together they claim 134% to 171% of recurring cash income.

That is not a solvency observation. With $47.8 million of borrowings against $61.6 million of cash and deposits at 31 March 2026 [59] and a $3.6 billion portfolio behind it, the company has ample capacity to borrow or sell. It is an observation about which of the three uses gets cut when coal dividends fall, and the 2024 and 2025 record answers it: the dividend did.

What would change the read

Three developments would move this analysis materially, and each is observable within a year. Alamtri and Adaro Andalan declaring 2026 dividends at or above 2025 levels would confirm the cash base at roughly $138 million; the sensitivity is straightforward, since every $30 million of lost coal dividends is 22% of that base and $0.0022 per share. Tower Bersama or Merdeka Copper Gold initiating a meaningful distribution would begin to close the gap between where the value sits and where the income comes from, and would be the most valuable single change to the cash profile. And a written payout policy — a stated share of dividends received rather than a percentage of a mark-to-market profit — would convert the largest per-share dividend in the company's history from an event into a claim, which is the difference between a 5.9% yield that can be underwritten and one that cannot.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run, so no broker note, investee dividend announcement or post-March-2026 disclosure could be checked beyond what the corpus and the compiled estimate data contain. The composition of the portfolio itself is treated in Portfolio and Discount; what this chapter adds is that the cash and the value inside it are carried by different assets.

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Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

What sits under the net asset value

Saratoga's net asset value is, in practice, four positions: a tower operator, a copper-gold-nickel miner, the two halves of the former Adaro coal group, and a motorcycle distributor. Their combined mark was $2,936 million at the end of 2025 against $3,710 million four years earlier, while everything else in the portfolio grew from $476 million to $711 million. A 10% move in those share prices changes reported equity by $277 million in the audited accounts.

The four are held in different ways, and only one of them is held directly in full. Merdeka Copper Gold is a straight 19.37% registered holding. Tower Bersama is 31.61%, of which only 9.37% is held through a wholly-owned subsidiary — the remaining 22.25% comes through Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, a Singapore company in which Saratoga holds 27.38% and which also owns assets other than towers [1]. The coal exposure is spread across four line items: 4.00% of Alamtri held directly, 4.38% of Adaro Andalan held directly, and 25.00% and 29.79% stakes in two associates, Adaro Strategic Capital and Adaro Strategic Lestari, whose fair value the notes describe as "mainly" representing indirect interests in the same two coal companies [2]. Mitra Pinasthika Mustika is 57.7% owned and still carried at its quoted price rather than consolidated [3].

Sources: valuations and effective ownership from the FY2025 Annual Report net asset valuation table [4]; business descriptions from the 2025 Portfolio Highlights [5], [6], [7], with Mitra Pinasthika Mustika's Honda distribution rights and JACCS MPM Finance stake from the FY2022 Annual Report [8].

Operationally, these are unlike each other in almost every respect that matters. Tower Bersama sells space on more than 24,300 telecommunication sites and distributed antenna networks under long-term contracts [9]; at the end of 2024 it carried over 42,000 tenants across nearly 24,000 sites [10]. Merdeka's economics are set at the mine gate: in 2024 the Tujuh Bukit gold mine produced 115,867 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of $1,337 per ounce against an average selling price of $2,371, Wetar produced 13,902 tonnes of copper, and Merdeka Battery Materials produced 82,161 tonnes of nickel pig iron and 50,315 tonnes of high-grade nickel matte [11]. Alamtri's forward case rests on a smelter: ADMR's aluminium plant was scheduled to begin operating in December 2025 at 500,000 tonnes a year, with planned expansion to 1.5 million tonnes [12]. Adaro Andalan is the thermal coal half of the old group, described by Saratoga as navigating "a normalizing global pricing environment" by growing volumes [13]. A contracted lease book, a mine, a smelter project and a coal seam do not respond to the same variables, and the record of the last five years shows it.

Four years of marks that ended where they started

Saratoga publishes each holding's mark every year, so the trajectory is checkable rather than inferred.

Source: net asset valuation tables in the FY2021 [14], FY2022 [15], FY2023 [16], FY2024 [17] and FY2025 [18] Annual Reports; coal is Adaro Energy Indonesia, renamed Alamtri Resources, plus Adaro Andalan from 2024.

Added together, the four were worth $3,710 million at the end of 2021 and $2,936 million at the end of 2025 — 7.7% lower after four years in rupiah terms. Tower Bersama was marked at $1,120 million against $1,602 million; Merdeka at $648 million against $1,141 million; the coal holdings, taken together across the 2024 separation, at $1,021 million against $765 million. The rest of the portfolio moved the other way, from $476 million to $711 million. But that increase is largely bought rather than compounded: Saratoga deployed $140 million of cash into investments in 2023 [19] and $358 million and $166 million in 2024 and 2025 [20] — $664 million in three years, part of which went into the four core names as well. Neither number is a return.

Two of the moves need qualifying rather than reading straight. Tower Bersama's 2022 fall from $1,602 million to $931 million is roughly half price and half structure: the share price went from $0.207 to $0.150, but effective ownership also dropped from 34.2% to 26.7% in the Bersama Digital restructuring, before recovering to 31.5% in 2023 [21], [22]. And the 2024 jump in the coal line reflects the separation of Adaro Andalan from Alamtri, not a doubling of the underlying business.

The choice of starting year does most of the work in any judgment here, and it should be stated rather than buried. Measured from the end of 2020, the same portfolio went from $2,416 million to $3,646 million, and net asset value per share from $0.164 to $0.267 [23]. Measured from the end of 2021, after the commodity surge had already been captured, net asset value per share rose 7.0% over four years in rupiah terms, before the $0.015 per share of dividends paid in the same window [24], [25], [26]. On the company's own disclosed Bank Indonesia mid rates, the rupiah went from 14,269 to the dollar at the end of 2021 to 16,782 at the end of 2025, so in dollar terms that per-share net asset value is 9.0% lower than it was four years ago [27], [28].

The operating line beneath the marks tells the same cyclical story. Saratoga's own investor presentation tracks the aggregate revenue of its listed portfolio: $1,218 million in 2018, rising to $3,779 million in 2022, then falling to $2,907 million in 2023 [29]. The 2021 peak in the marks was a coal price event before it was anything else — Newcastle thermal coal went from $80 a tonne at the start of 2021 to $150 by year-end, touching more than $200 in the third quarter [30].

Source: Saratoga investor presentation, January 2025 [31]. The presentation also shows a nine-month 2024 figure of $3,106 million, which is not comparable to the full years and is excluded here.

The internal offset and its limits

Whether the portfolio's parts hedge each other is answerable from the year-by-year changes rather than from any statement management makes.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, net asset valuation table [32]. The five components sum to the reported $307 million increase in the sum of investee companies.

In 2025 the coal holdings lost $250 million of value while Tower Bersama and Merdeka gained $352 million between them, and Saratoga attributes the year's $248 million net investment gain specifically to those two share prices [33].

The offset is worth being precise about, because only part of it is durable. Against coal, Tower Bersama has moved the other way in every one of the last four years: coal up 71% and towers down 37% in 2022 — a move that was half ownership change, as noted above — coal down 38% and towers up 15% in 2023, coal up 83% and towers down 3% in 2024, coal down 20% and towers up 17% in 2025. Merdeka has not. It rose with coal in 2022, fell with coal in 2023, and only diverged in 2024 and 2025. The year that matters most for a reader sizing downside is therefore 2023, when Merdeka fell $389 million and Adaro Energy fell $464 million together and the whole portfolio dropped 20% [34]. Roughly half the portfolio is metals and coal, and those two have moved together as often as apart. The tower stake is the genuine counterweight, and it is 30.7% of the book.

The fourth holding has done neither. Mitra Pinasthika Mustika has been marked lower in every year of this record — $203 million in 2021, then $184, $173, $155 and $147 million — a 15.7% decline in rupiah terms in the one operating business Saratoga controls outright.

Saratoga names a narrower version of this in its risk disclosures, where it says that "certain investments, such as in ADRO and MDKA, provide a natural hedge against the Company's U.S. dollar liabilities" [35]. That is a currency point, not a cycle point, and the dollar borrowings it hedges were down to $15.0 million at the end of 2025, against $50.5 million of dollar cash [36].

The company also trades around these positions more than a static holding table suggests. In 2025 it bought 121,764,199 Merdeka shares on 5 March, taking its stake to 20.08%, then sold 211,103,896 shares on 26 August, bringing it back to 19.47% — buying before a year in which Merdeka's marked price rose from $0.100 to $0.137, and trimming into it [37], [38]. Effective ownership of Alamtri rose from 15.78% to 16.52% and of Adaro Andalan from 14.21% to 15.15% over the same year, as those marks fell [39]. The filings do not separate purchases from the effect of investee buybacks, so the direction is clear but the mechanism is not.

Where management says the next capital goes

The forward sector list in the FY2025 report is short and consistent across both places it appears. The Board of Directors writes that capital is going toward "healthcare, digital infrastructure, renewables, and consumer", underpinned by demographics and the sustainability agenda and offering "multi-decade growth potential beyond cyclical trends" [40]. The Business Prospects section names the same four [41].

Against the holdings table, that list describes where the company intends to go rather than where it currently is. Tower Bersama qualifies as digital infrastructure and is 30.7% of the portfolio. Metals and coal — Merdeka, Alamtri and Adaro Andalan, 45.8% of the portfolio between them — are not named, though Alamtri's renewables arm and Merdeka's battery-materials business sit adjacent to two of the four themes. The phrase "beyond cyclical trends" is management's own characterisation of what the present portfolio is. Healthcare, renewables and consumer sit almost entirely inside the $711 million of everything else.

The segment note shows how that smaller half is performing. Saratoga reports three segments — Blue Chip, Digital Technology and Growth Focused. In 2025 the Growth Focused segment produced $90 million of income against an $18 million loss in 2024, with reportable assets up from $458 million to $568 million. The Digital Technology segment lost $18 million in 2025 after losing $16 million in 2024, and its reportable assets fell from $58 million to $43 million [42]. Two consecutive loss years and a 23% decline in carrying value is a small number against a $3,646 million portfolio, but it is the only part of the book where the newer strategy has a track record long enough to read.

How investee trouble reaches the balance sheet

Saratoga does not consolidate its investees and does not guarantee their debt. The FY2025 consolidated statements carry no contingent-liability note and disclose no guarantee given in favour of any portfolio company. The link the filings do disclose between an investee's share price and Saratoga's own obligations sits in the borrowings note: "The outstanding loans are secured by pledges of TBIG, MPMX, MDKA and/or ADRO shares, owned (directly or indirectly) by the Company. The Company is also required to maintain a certain minimum investment market value to debt." [43] The same wording appears in the 31 March 2026 interim statements, by which point borrowings had fallen to $44 million [44].

That is a margin-loan structure, and the minimum ratio itself is not disclosed. What is disclosed is how much headroom sits above it.

Sources: loan-to-value as disclosed in the FY2021 [45], FY2022 [46], FY2023 [47], FY2024 [48] and FY2025 [49] Annual Reports; the 2020 figure is as restated in the FY2021 report.

The stress arithmetic is undemanding. The most levered recent year-end was 2024, with $104 million of net debt against a $3,451 million portfolio [50]. Repeating 2023's 20% portfolio fall from that position would have taken loan-to-value from 3.0% to 3.8%; halving the portfolio would have taken it to 6.0%. On the end-2025 position of $29 million against $3,646 million, a 50% portfolio fall gives 1.6% [51]. For the pledge covenant to bite, the four listed prices would have to fall by an order of magnitude more than they ever have in this record. On the evidence available, the holding company's own solvency is not where the risk in this security sits.

The risk that does sit here is mark volatility, and the audited accounts quantify it directly. A 10% move in the relevant share prices at 31 December 2025 changes reported equity and profit by $112.0 million for Tower Bersama, $85.6 million for Alamtri and Adaro Andalan together, $64.9 million for Merdeka and $14.6 million for Mitra Pinasthika Mustika [52].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 18 Financial Risk Management, share price risk sensitivity as at 31 December 2025 [53].

Those four sensitivities total $277 million — 19.3% of the $1,313 million market capitalisation at the 27 July 2026 close, and 7.7% of published net asset value. One disclosure detail is worth flagging. The Tower Bersama, Merdeka and Mitra Pinasthika sensitivities are each exactly one-tenth of the value the net asset valuation table carries for them. The Alamtri and Adaro Andalan line is not: it implies a base of $856 million against the $1,021 million the same accounts carry for the four coal-linked holdings, a $165 million difference. In the FY2024 accounts the equivalent gap was $360 million [54], [55]. The likely explanation is the "mainly" in the associates footnote — Adaro Strategic Capital and Adaro Strategic Lestari hold assets besides coal shares — but the notes do not reconcile it, and the reader is left unable to size the coal exposure to better than a $165 million band.

Two smaller exposures complete the picture. Saratoga carried $44 million of receivables at the end of 2025, of which $42 million was declared but unpaid dividends from the Adaro complex and $1.6 million a loan to a growth company; against a gross balance of $48 million the group carries $4.0 million of impairment, down from $6.7 million a year earlier [56], [57]. And the leverage that does exist sits at the investees, where Saratoga's own filings record it without consolidating it: Tower Bersama issued $650 million of dollar bonds and $455 million of rupiah bonds in 2021 [58], $351 million in 2022 [59], $358 million in 2023 [60] and $291 million in 2024 [61]. Of the $1,000 million raised in rupiah over those three years, $840 million carried a 370-day tenor — a book that is refinanced continuously rather than termed out, alongside a $325 million revolving facility extended to October 2029 [62]. On the mining side, Merdeka raised $780 million across four bonds in 2022 [63], and in 2025 alone issued a further $168 million while Merdeka Battery Materials issued $1,008 million of sukuk [64].

Saratoga's own risk table concedes the exposure without quantifying it, listing "Exposure to Industry Risk in Which Our Investees Operate" and answering it with diversification and "regular performance and risk reviews" [65].

What would change the read

The read here is that the four core holdings are large, liquid positions whose aggregate mark is 7.7% lower than it was four years ago; that the tower stake has offset the commodity holdings in each of those four years while Merdeka has offset them in only two; and that investee leverage is substantial but reaches Saratoga only through a pledge covenant with headroom a repeat of the worst drawdown in this record would barely touch. Three things would move it.

If Adaro Andalan and Alamtri sustain distributions through a soft coal price — the January 2026 $250 million interim already approved is one data point [66], against $300 million paid in June 2025 for the prior year [67] — the coal half of the portfolio behaves more like an annuity than a price bet, and the 2025 marks understate it. If the ADMR aluminium smelter ramps to its 500,000 tonne phase one and Merdeka's downstream nickel projects convert capital expenditure into cash, the metals half becomes a compounder rather than a price proxy. And if the Growth Focused segment repeats 2025's $90 million of income for another two years, the case stops depending on the four core names at all.

The strongest fact against this read is the one that ends the section above: the $165 million unreconciled gap between the coal carrying value and the coal sensitivity base means the exposure cannot be sized precisely from these accounts. A reader who needs that precision has to go to Alamtri's and Adaro Andalan's own filings.

Two limits on this chapter should be stated plainly. None of the investees' own financial statements are in this corpus — every operating figure above is Saratoga's description of a company it does not control, published in its own annual report, and the investee-level balance sheets that would settle a look-through leverage question are not here. And web research was unavailable throughout this run, so no commodity price data, broker work or investee disclosure after March 2026 could be checked. The related question of what the unlisted 15% of the portfolio is actually worth is unexamined, as is the record of realisations across Saratoga's full listed life.

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Figures converted from IDR at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged. Quoted sentences from the filings are reproduced verbatim in their original currency.

Realisation Record

Saratoga's own Investment Milestones chart names nine divestments in the thirteen years since it listed, none of them from the four holdings that are four-fifths of the portfolio. Across FY2021 to FY2025 the company collected about $1,551 million from disposals and spent about $1,945 million on investments. Strip out the 2022 tower restructuring, which recycled most of its own proceeds within the year, and the record is $238 million realised against $756 million deployed.

Nine named exits since the listing

The 2013 prospectus offered 271,297,000 new shares at Rp5,500 — Rp1,492 billion, roughly $104 million at the earliest rate in the conversion table, 10.0% of the enlarged capital [1]. That prospectus defined sixteen investee companies [2]. Four of them are still identified by name in the net-asset table at 31 December 2025: Alamtri Resources (the renamed Adaro Energy, from which Adaro Andalan was separated), Tower Bersama, Mitra Pinasthika Mustika and Nusa Raya Cipta [3].

The company publishes its own record of what it sold. The Divestment row of the Investment Milestones chart carries entries in five of the thirteen listed years.

Source: Investment Milestones, FY2022 Annual Report [4] and FY2025 Annual Report [5], [6].

The chart records no divestment at all in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 or 2025 [4] [6]. The 2018 exit from Batu Hitam Perkasa, the Paiton Energy holding vehicle, is the last named sale of a large infrastructure asset. The four exits recorded since — two hospitals-and-data-centre positions in 2023, two smaller holdings in 2024 — came from the growth book, not from the blue-chip core. Saratoga has never reduced a core position other than by trading around it: Merdeka shares bought in March 2025 and partly sold in August, coal weightings raised as those marks fell, and Nusa Raya Cipta taken from 7% to 6.0% during a year in which its quoted price went from $0.022 to $0.092 [3].

How the company describes the activity is consistent with that record. The third pillar of its stated approach, after Invest and Grow, is Monetize: "We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities" [7]. That is capital-markets access supplied to investees, not realisation of Saratoga's own stakes. The corporate website is the only place that frames exits from the holding company's side: "When the time is right, we capitalize on well-planned exit strategies — through IPOs or trade sales — to deliver optimal returns for our stakeholders" [8].

The flows run the other way

The audited cash flow statements record disposals and purchases as separate operating lines. Over six years they look like this.

Sources: consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 Annual Report [9], FY2023 Annual Report [10] and FY2025 Annual Report [11]; converted at period-end rates.

One year dominates everything. In 2022 Saratoga received about $1,313 million from sales and withdrawals of investments and paid out about $1,189 million for new ones [10]. The MD&A presents the receipt as a realisation: "In 2022, Saratoga sold some of its investments and earned more than IDR20,200 billion, in comparison with IDR443 billion in the previous year" [12].

The underlying transaction was a restructuring, disclosed as a material transaction worth 32.32% of the Company's equity: Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera sold Tower Bersama shares to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, and Lynwood Hills subscribed for BDIA shares [13]. Both entities are Saratoga subsidiaries. Note 5 shows about $1,379 million leaving the blue-chip book and about $1,133 million entering it in the same year [14], and effective ownership of Tower Bersama moved from 34.23% to 26.69%, of which 29.64% was now held through BDIA [15]. Management's own summary of the cash effect is narrower than the headline: "we also received IDR2.2 trillion from the divestment of 3% of our shareholding in PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk., as part of its successful restructuring into Digital Bersama Infrastructure Asia" [16] — about $143 million. The cash flow statement nets to roughly $124 million retained for the year.

That $124 million is close to what shareholders subsequently received: about $53 million paid in 2022 and $66 million in 2023, $118 million between them [10]. The largest realisation in Saratoga's listed history did reach the register — the qualification is that it was a recapitalisation of a stake the company still owns, not a sale of it.

Sources: derived from consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 [9], FY2023 [10] and FY2025 [11] Annual Reports, converted at period-end rates; the June 2026 distribution is press-reported [17].

Excluding 2022, the four remaining years produced about $238 million of proceeds against about $756 million of deployment — a little over three dollars invested for every dollar realised. Deployment was funded in part by borrowing: about $219 million of new bank loans was drawn in 2024 against about $80 million repaid [11]. The direction has not changed in the current year: the first quarter of 2026 brought about $10.8 million of proceeds against $5.3 million of purchases and an $8.6 million time-deposit placement [18].

Where the new money goes is worth noting alongside this. The FY2025 report's own funnel shows 99 opportunities screened, 8 taken to preliminary assessment, 1 term sheet and no new investments at all, against about $166 million deployed [19]. The full year's capital went into positions Saratoga already owned.

What the exits fetched

Three separate disclosures bear on whether assets leave at their carrying value.

The clearest single case is Provident Investasi Bersama. Note 5 carried the 19.87% stake at about $57.5 million at 31 December 2023 and shows no balance a year later [20]. The MD&A's fair-value adjustment table records a $24.1 million loss on that position during 2024, against $0.9 million the year before [21]. The position therefore left the balance sheet at roughly $30.7 million, about 44% below the mark it carried entering the year. Growth-focused divestments in 2024 totalled about $37.1 million across all disposals [22], which is consistent with that reading.

Second, the parent company's tax reconciliation carries a line for loss on sale of investments and derivative instruments, added back to accounting profit. It runs about $0.2 million for 2023, $10.8 million for 2024 [23] and $5.4 million for 2025 [24] — about $16 million of realised losses in three years. Two limits apply. The line is the standalone Company reconciliation, so it excludes disposals made inside subsidiaries, which is where Provident Investasi Bersama sat. And it bundles derivatives with investments. The comparatives are also unstable: the FY2022 filing showed a $2.9 million gain for 2022 where the FY2023 filing shows a $15.0 million loss, the $17.9 million difference having been reclassified out of the final-taxed income line [25]. The 2023 to 2025 figures are the ones that agree across filings.

Third, and quantitatively larger, part of the portfolio has left by markdown rather than by sale. Note 5's smallest two categories tell that story directly.

Sources: Note 5 summary of changes in fair values, FY2021 [26], FY2023 [14] and FY2025 [27] Annual Reports, converted at period-end rates.

The digital technology book peaked at about $34.1 million at the end of 2022 and stood at about $3.1 million at the end of 2025 [14] [27]. Of the decline in 2025, about $14.2 million was a fair-value change and only $0.24 million a divestment [27]. The Others category fell from about $18.7 million at the end of 2020 to $0.04 million at the end of 2025 [26] [27]. Together those two buckets shed about $34 million from their 2022 peak, almost none of it through a transaction. That is 2.1% of the $1,313 million market capitalisation — small against the portfolio, but it is the part of the book where a realisation record could most easily have been built, and it was not.

The disposals themselves are not itemised. In 2025 the cash statement shows about $107.5 million received while note 5 removes about $71.7 million of carrying value [11] [27], and no note reconciles the two or names what was sold. The cash-flow line is also labelled "proceeds from withdrawal of investments" in 2025, where in 2023 it read "sales/withdrawal" [11] [10]. Deal-level realisation evidence is thin enough that a definitive statement about whether Saratoga's marks are achievable in a sale cannot be made from this corpus.

Buybacks and treasury shares

The second route by which a holding company can convert a discount into value for continuing shareholders is repurchasing its own stock. Saratoga has spent about $4.3 million on treasury shares in six years: about $3.9 million in 2020 [9], $0.06 million in 2022 and $0.34 million in 2023 [10], and nothing in 2021, 2024 or 2025 [11]. That is 0.26% of the current market capitalisation, cumulative.

The holding is also shrinking rather than growing. Treasury stock stood at 15,002,100 shares carried at about $0.59 million at 31 December 2025, down from 20,307,100 shares at about $0.83 million a year earlier, because 5,305,000 shares were distributed to employees under the long-term incentive programme in 2025 and 8,031,900 in 2024 [28]. The remaining balance is 0.11% of issued capital [29]. The extraordinary meeting of June 2025 approved allocating up to 5,500,000 treasury shares to directors and employees [30], and the May 2024 meeting up to 8,500,000 [32]. The buyback authority in force serves compensation, not the discount. No corpus document discusses repurchasing shares to narrow the gap to net asset value.

The company also confirms it has raised no new public capital since the 2013 offering and that the IPO proceeds are fully spent [31]. Whatever the record says about returning capital, it says nothing about diluting shareholders to raise it.

Reading it, and what would change it

The evidence points to a company that compounds inside the portfolio rather than one that harvests it. Nine named exits in thirteen years, none from the core; a five-year record of deploying three dollars for every one realised once the 2022 restructuring is set aside; a growth book whose weakest positions were written down rather than sold; and a treasury account that funds pay rather than shrinking the share count. On that record, the gap between price and net asset value has no scheduled mechanism for closing, and the reasonable base case is that it closes only if the marks themselves rise or the dividend keeps stepping up.

The strongest fact against that read is the 2022 sequence. When a genuine realisation of scale did occur, the cash was not retained: about $118 million went out as dividends across the following two payment years, close to the $124 million the year netted [10]. The June 2026 distribution of about $77 million followed a year in which borrowings fell to about $87 million [17] [3]. The pattern is not that realised cash gets trapped; it is that realisations are rare.

Three observable things would change the read. A sale of any part of a core holding to a third party at or near the marked price, with the proceeds distributed rather than redeployed — the marks and the willingness to convert them would both be tested at once. A treasury programme sized in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than single-digit millions, bought at a discount to net asset value. Or an initial public offering of an unlisted position — Brawijaya Healthcare is the largest — which would move value from a Level 3 estimate to an observable price and give the growth book its first realisation of scale. None of these has been announced in any corpus document.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run: the search provider returned an insufficient-credit error on retry for this chapter, as it did for the three before it. No post-March-2026 disclosure, broker commentary or transaction report could be checked, so the absence of a recent divestment announcement is an absence in this corpus rather than established fact.