Chapter 4

Figures converted from IDR at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged. Quoted sentences from the filings are reproduced verbatim in their original currency.

Realisation Record

Saratoga's own Investment Milestones chart names nine divestments in the thirteen years since it listed, none of them from the four holdings that are four-fifths of the portfolio. Across FY2021 to FY2025 the company collected about $1,551 million from disposals and spent about $1,945 million on investments. Strip out the 2022 tower restructuring, which recycled most of its own proceeds within the year, and the record is $238 million realised against $756 million deployed.

Nine named exits since the listing

The 2013 prospectus offered 271,297,000 new shares at Rp5,500 — Rp1,492 billion, roughly $104 million at the earliest rate in the conversion table, 10.0% of the enlarged capital [1]. That prospectus defined sixteen investee companies [2]. Four of them are still identified by name in the net-asset table at 31 December 2025: Alamtri Resources (the renamed Adaro Energy, from which Adaro Andalan was separated), Tower Bersama, Mitra Pinasthika Mustika and Nusa Raya Cipta [3].

The company publishes its own record of what it sold. The Divestment row of the Investment Milestones chart carries entries in five of the thirteen listed years.

Source: Investment Milestones, FY2022 Annual Report [4] and FY2025 Annual Report [5], [6].

The chart records no divestment at all in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 or 2025 [7] [8]. The 2018 exit from Batu Hitam Perkasa, the Paiton Energy holding vehicle, is the last named sale of a large infrastructure asset. The four exits recorded since — two hospitals-and-data-centre positions in 2023, two smaller holdings in 2024 — came from the growth book, not from the blue-chip core. Saratoga has never reduced a core position other than by trading around it: Merdeka shares bought in March 2025 and partly sold in August [9], coal weightings raised as those marks fell, and Nusa Raya Cipta taken from 7% to 6.0% during a year in which its quoted price went from $0.022 to $0.092 [10].

How the company describes the activity is consistent with that record. The third pillar of its stated approach, after Invest and Grow, is Monetize: "We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities" [11]. That is capital-markets access supplied to investees, not realisation of Saratoga's own stakes. The corporate website is the only place that frames exits from the holding company's side: "When the time is right, we capitalize on well-planned exit strategies — through IPOs or trade sales — to deliver optimal returns for our stakeholders" [12].

The flows run the other way

The audited cash flow statements record disposals and purchases as separate operating lines. Over six years they look like this.

Sources: consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 Annual Report [13], FY2023 Annual Report [14] and FY2025 Annual Report [15]; converted at period-end rates.

One year dominates everything. In 2022 Saratoga received about $1,313 million from sales and withdrawals of investments and paid out about $1,189 million for new ones [16]. The MD&A presents the receipt as a realisation: "In 2022, Saratoga sold some of its investments and earned more than IDR20,200 billion, in comparison with IDR443 billion in the previous year" [17].

The underlying transaction was a restructuring, disclosed as a material transaction worth 32.32% of the Company's equity: Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera sold Tower Bersama shares to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, and Lynwood Hills subscribed for BDIA shares [18]. Both entities are Saratoga subsidiaries. Note 5 shows about $1,379 million leaving the blue-chip book and about $1,133 million entering it in the same year [19], and effective ownership of Tower Bersama moved from 34.23% to 26.69%, with 4.95% still held through Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera and the balance through a 29.64% interest in BDIA [20]. Management's own summary of the cash effect is narrower than the headline: "we also received IDR2.2 trillion from the divestment of 3% of our shareholding in PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk., as part of its successful restructuring into Digital Bersama Infrastructure Asia" [21] — about $143 million. The cash flow statement nets to roughly $124 million retained for the year.

That $124 million is close to what shareholders subsequently received: about $53 million paid in 2022 and $66 million in 2023, $118 million between them [22]. The largest realisation in Saratoga's listed history did reach the register — the qualification is that it was a recapitalisation of a stake the company still owns, not a sale of it.

Sources: derived from consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 [23], FY2023 [24] and FY2025 [25] Annual Reports, converted at period-end rates; the June 2026 distribution is press-reported [26].

Excluding 2022, the four remaining years produced about $238 million of proceeds against about $756 million of deployment — a little over three dollars invested for every dollar realised. Deployment was funded in part by borrowing: about $219 million of new bank loans was drawn in 2024 against about $80 million repaid [27]. The direction has not changed in the current year: the first quarter of 2026 brought about $10.8 million of proceeds against $5.3 million of purchases and an $8.6 million time-deposit placement [28].

Where the new money goes is worth noting alongside this. The FY2025 report's own funnel shows 99 opportunities screened, 8 taken to preliminary assessment, 1 term sheet and no new investments at all, against about $166 million deployed [29]. The full year's capital went into positions Saratoga already owned.

What the exits fetched

Three separate disclosures bear on whether assets leave at their carrying value.

The clearest single case is Provident Investasi Bersama. Note 5 carried the 19.87% stake at about $57.5 million at 31 December 2023 and shows no balance a year later [30]. The MD&A's fair-value adjustment table records a $24.1 million loss on that position during 2024, against $0.9 million the year before [31]. The position therefore left the balance sheet at roughly $30.7 million, about 44% below the mark it carried entering the year. Growth-focused divestments in 2024 totalled about $37.1 million across all disposals [32], which is consistent with that reading.

Second, the parent company's tax reconciliation carries a line for loss on sale of investments and derivative instruments, added back to accounting profit. It runs about $0.2 million for 2023, $10.8 million for 2024 [33] and $5.4 million for 2025 [34] — about $16 million of realised losses in three years. Two limits apply. The line is the standalone Company reconciliation, so it excludes disposals made inside subsidiaries, which is where Provident Investasi Bersama sat. And it bundles derivatives with investments. The comparatives are also unstable: the FY2022 filing showed a $2.9 million gain for 2022 [35] where the FY2023 filing shows a $15.0 million loss, the $17.9 million difference having been reclassified out of the final-taxed income line [36]. The 2023 to 2025 figures are the ones that agree across filings.

Third, and quantitatively larger, part of the portfolio has left by markdown rather than by sale. Note 5's smallest two categories tell that story directly.

Sources: Note 5 summary of changes in fair values, FY2021 [37], FY2023 [38] and FY2025 [39] Annual Reports, converted at period-end rates.

The digital technology book peaked at about $34.1 million at the end of 2022 and stood at about $3.1 million at the end of 2025 [40] [41]. Of the decline in 2025, about $14.2 million was a fair-value change and only $0.24 million a divestment [42]. The Others category fell from about $18.7 million at the end of 2020 to $0.04 million at the end of 2025 [43] [44]. Together those two buckets shed about $34 million from their 2022 peak, almost none of it through a transaction. That is 2.4% of the $1,286 million market capitalisation at the end of 2025 [45] — small against the portfolio, but it is the part of the book where a realisation record could most easily have been built, and it was not.

The disposals themselves are not itemised. In 2025 the cash statement shows about $107.5 million received while note 5 removes about $71.7 million of carrying value [46] [47], and no note reconciles the two or names what was sold. The cash-flow line is also labelled "proceeds from withdrawal of investments" in 2025, where in 2023 it read "sales/withdrawal" [48] [49]. Deal-level realisation evidence is thin enough that a definitive statement about whether Saratoga's marks are achievable in a sale cannot be made from this corpus.

Buybacks and treasury shares

The second route by which a holding company can convert a discount into value for continuing shareholders is repurchasing its own stock. Saratoga has spent about $4.3 million on treasury shares in six years: about $3.9 million in 2020 [50], $0.06 million in 2022 and $0.34 million in 2023 [51], and nothing in 2021, 2024 or 2025 [52]. That is 0.29% of that market capitalisation, cumulative.

The holding is also shrinking rather than growing. Treasury stock stood at 15,002,100 shares carried at about $0.59 million at 31 December 2025, down from 20,307,100 shares at about $0.83 million a year earlier, because 5,305,000 shares were distributed to employees under the long-term incentive programme in 2025 and 8,031,900 in 2024 [53]. The remaining balance is 0.11% of issued capital [54]. The extraordinary meeting of June 2025 approved allocating up to 5,500,000 treasury shares to directors and employees [55], and the May 2024 meeting up to 8,500,000 [56]. The buyback authority in force serves compensation, not the discount. No corpus document discusses repurchasing shares to narrow the gap to net asset value.

The company also confirms that the 2013 IPO proceeds are fully spent and that it conducted no public offering of equity or debt securities during 2025 [57]. Whatever the record says about returning capital, it says nothing about diluting shareholders to raise it.

Reading it, and what would change it

The evidence points to a company that compounds inside the portfolio rather than one that harvests it. Nine named exits in thirteen years, none from the core; a five-year record of deploying three dollars for every one realised once the 2022 restructuring is set aside; a growth book whose weakest positions were written down rather than sold; and a treasury account that funds pay rather than shrinking the share count. On that record, the gap between price and net asset value has no scheduled mechanism for closing, and the reasonable base case is that it closes only if the marks themselves rise or the dividend keeps stepping up.

The strongest fact against that read is the 2022 sequence. When a genuine realisation of scale did occur, the cash was not retained: about $118 million went out as dividends across the following two payment years, close to the $124 million the year netted [58]. The June 2026 distribution of about $77 million followed a year in which borrowings fell to about $87 million [59] [60]. The pattern is not that realised cash gets trapped; it is that realisations are rare.

Three observable things would change the read. A sale of any part of a core holding to a third party at or near the marked price, with the proceeds distributed rather than redeployed — the marks and the willingness to convert them would both be tested at once. A treasury programme sized in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than single-digit millions, bought at a discount to net asset value. Or an initial public offering of an unlisted position — Brawijaya Healthcare is the largest — which would move value from a Level 3 estimate to an observable price and give the growth book its first realisation of scale. None of these has been announced in any corpus document.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run: the search provider returned an insufficient-credit error on retry for this chapter, as it did for the three before it. No post-March-2026 disclosure, broker commentary or transaction report could be checked, so the absence of a recent divestment announcement is an absence in this corpus rather than established fact.